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Understanding the role of self-generated movements in perceptual learning is central
to action-based theories of perception. Pioneering work on sensory adaptation by
Richard M. Held during the 1950s and 1960s can still shed light on this question. In a
variety of rich experiments Held and his team demonstrated the need for self-generated
movements in sensory adaptation and perceptual learning. This body of work received
different critical interpretations, was then forgotten for some time, and saw a surge of
revived interest within embodied cognitive science. Through a brief review of Held’s
work and reactions to it, we seek to contribute to discussions on the role of activity and
passivity in perceptual learning. We classify different positions according to whether this
role is considered to be contextual (facilitatory, but not necessary), enabling (causally
necessary), or constitutive (an inextricable part of the learning process itself). We also
offer a critique of the notions of activity and passivity and how they are operationalized
in experimental studies. The active-passive distinction is not a binary but involves a
series of dimensions and relative degrees that can make it difficult to interpret and
replicate experimental results. We introduce three of these dimensions drawing on work
on the sense of agency: action initiation, control, and monitoring. These refinements
in terms of causal relations and dimensions of activity-passivity should help illuminate
open questions concerning the role of activity in perception and perceptual learning and
clarify the convergences and differences between enaction and ecological psychology.
Keywords: Richard M. Held, sensory adaptation, perceptual learning, self-generated movements, activity,
passivity, enaction, ecological psychology
INTRODUCTION
Action-based accounts of perception maintain that there are functional and conceptual links
between action and perception (e.g., O’Regan and Noë, 2001; Noë, 2004; Pulvermüller and Fadiga,
2010). These perspectives are advocated both by enactivists and ecological psychologists (e.g.,
Varela et al., 1991; Reed, 1996; Chemero, 2009; Di Paolo et al., 2017) and can serve to highlight
the convergences and the differences between these approaches. In the extensive literature on the
subject one experiment has become iconic. In a study conducted in 1963, Richard Held and Alan
Hein tested the development of visually guided behavior in kittens reared in the dark who were
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placed in pairs in an illuminated carousel. One of the kittens was
“passive” and could not self-locomote. The other was “active”
and was free to move by itself while pulling the passive kitten
through a transmission mechanism that produced an equivalent
visual stimulation. The kittens experienced this condition for 3 h
a day for a period of 8 weeks. They were then tested on the visual
cliff. Unlike active kittens, passive kittens did not show evidence
of differentiating the shallow edge of the cliff from the apparent
drop. From this, Held and Hein concluded that self-generated
movements are crucial for the development of visual perceptual
skills. The experiment is often mentioned in the enactivist and
ecological psychology literature (e.g., Gibson, 1969; Varela et al.,
1991; Noë, 2004; Heras-Escribano, 2019).
This was not an isolated study. It was part of an extensive
research program led by Richard Marx Held (1922–2016) during
the 1950s and 1960s. We think that the hypotheses, the innovative
experimental designs, and the discussions provoked by these
studies are still relevant today. Through a brief review of Held’s
work, we seek to contribute to discussions about the role of
self-generated movements in perceptual learning. Is the self-
generation of movements, or “active movements,” a necessary
condition for acquiring new perceptual abilities? Or is it possible
to learn to perceive without moving actively, i.e., or through
“passive,” externally controlled movements?
Our main conclusion will be that many of the terms in these
seemingly clear questions require clarification. In particular, we
qualify the terms “active” and “passive” because the discussion
will lead us to examine how these notions have been used in
experimental psychology and neuroscience. We suggest that what
is typically taken as a binary distinction is in fact a spectrum
of possibilities with various degrees and different dimensions
of activity and passivity. This may be one reason why it is
sometimes difficult to replicate experimental results and reach
widely accepted conclusions regarding the role of action in
perception. We will draw on recent work on the sense of agency
to refine the active-passive distinction. We will also offer three
distinct meanings for claims concerning the role of activity in
perceptual learning.
HELD’S STUDIES ON SENSORY
ADAPTATION
Participants in sensory adaptation experiments use interfaces that
induce perceptual changes. For example, combinations of special
lenses, prisms, and mirrors. The sensory disruption puts in
evidence relations between action and perception that otherwise
remain hidden. In order to learn to behave and perceive correctly
again (in the cases when adaptation occurs), participants must
modify their repertoire of sensorimotor schemes. Hermann
von Helmholtz and George Stratton performed pioneering
studies in visual sensory adaptation in the nineteenth century
(Welch, 1974). A few decades later Ewert (1930); Peterson
and Peterson (1938) carried out further studies involving long-
term exposure and adaptation. The period ranging from the
late 1950s to the early 1970s was particularly fruitful with
researchers like John G. Taylor, Irving Rock, Hans Wallach
making important contributions (Welch, 1974, 1978). According
to Welch, the increase in interest may be traced to two sources:
the publication by Kohler (1964) of the extensive investigations
that he and Theodor Erismann had carried out at the University
of Innsbruck, and the work by Held and collaborators. At
that time, the team led by Held was setting the pace of the
investigation. This period covers his time at Brandeis University
(1953–1962) and his first stage at MIT (1962–1971).
During the period in question Held was devoted to
the study of adaptation to spatially inverted, reversed, and
displaced perception. In most cases he used a technique called
rearrangement, which consisted in presenting participants with
a deliberate distortion of visual or auditory signals through
special sensory interfaces. Contemporary studies in sensory
adaptation continue to use variations of this method (e.g.,
Pfordresher and Kulpa, 2011; Bermejo et al., 2020). In typical
experiments, Held exposed participants to rearrangement in
pretest-posttest designs. To evaluate the effect of self-movement,
participants generally underwent an active condition, in which
they could move by themselves, and a passive condition, where an
experimenter produced in the participant movements equivalent
to the active condition. Results, replicated over a series of studies,
showed that participants almost invariably compensated for the
errors induced by rearrangement only or much more reliably in
the active condition (e.g., Held and Hein, 1958; Held and Bossom,
1961; Held and Rekosh, 1963; Held and Mikaelian, 1964).
It is worth taking a brief look at some of these experiments.
In one of his first studies, Held (1955) evaluated the effect of
experiencing spatially distorted sound cues on sound localization.
He used a “pseudophone” that modified the sound streams
arriving at the ears causing perceived sounds to be displaced
to the left or right. Participants had to orient toward a sound
source before and after having practiced with the pseudophone in
conditions of self-locomotion. Results showed shifts of auditory
localization responses that evidenced a correction of the error
induced by the device. Held suggested that adaptation happened
because participants were able to associate new interaural
patterns with their own movements toward the source. This early
formulation of his hypothesis led him to include a passive group
in subsequent designs.
In an experiment looking at visual rearrangement, Held
and Hein (1958) asked participants to mark with a pencil the
apparent location of the corners of a square. They could see
their own hands through a prism that produced a lateral visual
displacement under different conditions: self-produced hand
movement, passive hand movement guided by an experimenter,
and no hand movement. The only condition in which the
participants were able to compensate for visual displacement
was when they could move actively. Held and Bossom (1961)
extended the prism rearrangement situation to locomotion. They
found that an equivalent correction effect in visual direction-
finding occurred when participants performed active self-
locomotion. They did not compensate if they were transported by
an experimenter in a wheelchair. In a follow-up experiment, Held
and Mikaelian (1964) evaluated whether the lack of adaptation
in the passive condition could be attributed only to the passivity
involved in not being able to initiate movements or in the lack of
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specificity between movement and contingent stimulation. They
replicated Held and Bossom’s (1961) study with the difference
that they allowed participants to control the movement of the
wheelchair. Adaptation occurred when participants walked by
themselves but not when they used the wheelchair. The authors
concluded that motor-sensory feedback must correspond to the
specific behavior undergoing adaptation, i.e., walking for visual
egocentric localization.
These and other studies pointed to similar conclusions1, which
Held (1965) explained in terms of the active regulation of the
plasticity of sensorimotor systems. Situations of rearrangement
degrade established patterns of sensorimotor coordination.
Under typical conditions, the relation between self-produced
movements and stable parts of the environment is univocal
and lawful. Each movement has its unique train of sensory
stimulations and the perceiver is adapted to this lawful relation.
A rearrangement situation alters this relation, confounding
participants. A given familiar movement will have unexpected
sensory consequences, and expected sensory consequences can
only be obtained by the performance of unfamiliar movements.
New lawful sensorimotor relations may exist in the rearranged
situation but these are not yet obvious to the perceiver. This
leads to an increase in performance variability and a decrease
in accuracy. As the perceiver explores and practices movements
in the rearranged situation, progressive shifts in coordination
compensate for the errors induced by the atypical conditions.
Gradually, as the new sensorimotor regularities are learned,
performance becomes more robust and accurate. This same logic
also explains the presence of aftereffects: returning to the original
condition after prolonged exposure to the rearranged situation
gives rise to errors similar, but in the opposite direction, to those
initially induced by rearrangement.
Held consistently finds that self-produced movements are key
to adaptation. When movements are passive, the condition of a
degraded lawful relation between action and perception does not
manifest in the same manner, and consequently adaptation does
not occur reliably (Held and Freedman, 1963). “Only an organism
that can take account of the output signals to its own musculature
is in a position to detect and factor out the rearrangement effects
of both moving objects and externally imposed body movement”
(Held, 1965, p. 92).
In this context, a key concept is that of re-afferent signals, i.e.,
stimulation caused by self-produced movements. Exafference, in
contrast, is the stimulation that is not induced by the agent’s own
movements. Both of these terms are taken from the “efference
copy” formulation by von Holst and Mittelstaedt (1950), an
influential model explaining the possible mechanisms involved
in perceiving the stable attributes of space.
Another key concept is correlation, which is used to describe
the relationship between self-produced movements and re-
afference. Because in a stable environment there is a unique
feedback signal for any particular movement, it is expected that
as time passes, the cumulatively experienced efferent and re-
afferent signals will show high correlation. The quasi-constant
1According to the SCOPUS database, Held with his team published 34 articles
related to this topic between 1955 and 1974.
relationships in correlations give rise to the idea of a motor-
sensory feedback loop. Sensorimotor coordination of perceptual
systems is grounded in the information entailed in these loops
(Held and Freedman, 1963).
Held and Freedman (1963) considered these adaptive
mechanisms to underlie perceptual learning at any stage of life.
At this point, the proposal became a “general theory of the
plastic sensorimotor systems” (Held and Freedman, 1963, p. 455)
in which the same sensorimotor coordination mechanism is
involved in three processes: “(1) the development of normal
sensory-motor control in the young, (2) the maintenance of that
control once it has developed and (3) the adaptation to changes
or apparent changes in the data reported by the senses of sight
and hearing” (Held, 1965, p. 84).
Held and colleagues tested this theory by looking at
sensorimotor development in young animals. The already
mentioned kittens study by Held and Hein (1963) was one in
this experimental series. In follow-up studies, Hein et al. (1970)
evaluated three hypotheses derived from the carousel experiment.
First, they investigated whether the deficit of the passive kittens
in the acquisition of visually controlled behavior was due to a
facilitating effect of self-locomotion or whether it was impeded
by passive transport. To test this, they implemented a similar set-
up, with the difference that after being exposed to the passive
condition, kittens were allowed to experience the active role for
a few hours a day over several days. The results showed that
previous exposure to passive transport led to a significant delay
in the number of hours needed to acquire a simple visuo-motor
capacity (limb extension towards an approaching broad surface)
with respect to the group that could always self-locomote.
The authors conducted a second study to determine if passive
kittens failed in the visual cliff due to a generalized inhibition
of locomotion behavior in response to visual stimuli. In this
case, they exposed each eye under a different condition: “periods
when visual stimulation of one eye accompanied self-produced
movement alternated with periods when visual stimulation was
provided to the other eye during passive transport” (Hein et al.,
1970, p. 184). As predicted, when kittens could use the eye
exposed in the active condition, they were successful both in
extension response tests and in the visual cliff. When the same
kittens had to use the other eye, they failed in both tasks.
A third experiment extended a study by Hein and Held
(1967). When kittens who are prevented from seeing their paws
during rearing are carried down toward the edge of a horizontal
surface, they show fragmented visual control of their forelimbs
(extension but not accurate guidance). Failure to develop guided
reaching did not affect the use of the limbs for visually guided
locomotion, suggesting that reaching is a separate kind of
visuo-motor coordination. In the new experiment, Hein et al.
(1970) tested whether visually guided reaching might be acquired
independently by each eye. The results showed that when the
kittens used the eye that had not received visual input from their
own limbs, they failed in visually guided reaching and succeeded
when using the other eye. Visually guided reaching did not
transfer interocularly.
These follow-up studies support and refine Held’s proposal
concerning the enabling role of active movements in perceptual
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 May 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 844
fpsyg-11-00844 May 15, 2020 Time: 20:18 # 4
Bermejo et al. Activity/Passivity in Perceptual Learning
learning, showing that the control of visually guided behavior
can be acquired independently for each eye and that an
unsystematic correlation between self-movement and visual
stimulation produces disruptive effects.
Prior to the kittens experiments, Held made an attempt to
adapt his theoretical perspective to von Holst and Mittelstaedt’s
(1950) “efference copy” model. Briefly, this model proposes
that at the time of motor preparation, copies of the efferent
motor information are used to calculate the sensory changes
expected as a consequence of its execution. After the effective
execution, a real proprioceptive feedback is generated, which
will balance the predicted sensory feedback at the level of a
so-called “Comparator.” In the case of not finding differences
between the two signals, the changes in the afferences would be
due to the re-afferences. Otherwise, the changes would be the
result of the exafferences. Held (1961) proposed to supplement
this model with mechanisms that account for the possibility of
adapting to rearrangement situations. To do this, he conceived
of an instance before the Comparator stage, which he called
Correlation Storage. This module would be responsible for
retaining combinations of concurrent efferent and re-afferent
signals. The selection of a determinate efferent signal activates a
combination that then passes on to the Comparator. In cases of
adaptation, correlations of signals must be permanently updated.
If the combinations are systematically changed it may happen
that the same efferent signal can activate different combinations.
This ambiguity will be gradually eliminated as more recent
combinations gain more weight.
Evidently this model distances Held’s proposal from
perspectives such as ecological psychology and enactivism
due to its reliance on internalist explanations. However, Held
himself did not make much explicit use of this model. To
understand his proposal more fully, it is necessary to take into
account that:
(a) In the 1950s and 1960s models such as the “efference
copy” were in full swing. Simultaneously, von Holst
and Mittelstaedt (1950) and Sperry (1950) had proposed
equivalent models and researchers such as Hans-Lukas
Teuber, who was head of Held’s department at MIT, were
working on these theories. It is likely that this context
encouraged Held to reformulate his ideas in terms of
comparator models.
(b) The model was only described in his first theoretical work
(Held, 1961). In future articles, he did not return to it.
Since then his explanations were formulated in terms of
self-produced movements, reafference, and the correlation
between them, without any mention of instances such as
Correlation Storage.
(c) Held clearly rejected internalist interpretations.
Immediately after describing the model in the 1961
paper, he remarked that his view of perception does not fit
with the idea of the information processor:
“The proposed system neither selects nor filters the incoming
signals it receives on the basis of special functional
relations or orderings (other than temporal) between the
efferent and afferent signals. We can hope that the model
forestalls assertions that the nervous system actively seeks
a special kind of order which it may store for future
reference. Such statements seem to me to beg the issue
by assuming an internal “intelligence” to accomplish
precisely what requires explanation. (. . .) If models of the
sort proposed convincingly account for adaptive, as well
as non-adaptive, psychological processes, we need have
recourse neither to a mysterious internal “intelligence”
that somewhat knows how to recognize and select useful
sensory information nor to the equally mysterious external
“intelligence” that manages to reinforce just those responses
to sensory stimuli that will prove useful to the organism”
(Held, 1961, pp. 31–32).
We may summarize Held’s proposal for explaining sensory
adaptation by these claims:
• Self-produced movements are necessary for developing a
perceptual ability.
• The stable perception of the environment relies on the
consistent coordination of sensorimotor loops.
• Sensory adaptation involves, at first, the disruption of
previously established sensorimotor coordination. This is
followed by the active gradual reconstruction of new stable
sensorimotor patterns.
• The structure of reconstructed sensorimotor loops is
constrained by bodily and environmental features and
depends on the particular patterns of active practice.
• These principles are not restricted to the visual system, but
form part of a general model of perceptual learning.
SOME REACTIONS TO HELD’S
PROPOSAL
Given the interest raised by Held’s experiments, many
contemporary and later studies attempted to replicate their
results. Some of them had difficulty doing so. Some found no
significant differences in the adaptation achieved between the
conditions of passive and active movements (Weinstein et al.,
1964; Pick and Hay, 1965; Singer and Day, 1966; Fishkin, 1969;
Foley and Maynes, 1969; Baily, 1972; Gyr et al., 1979). There were
even studies that showed the possibility of adaptation without
movements at all (Howard et al., 1965; Kravitz and Wallach,
1966). The kittens study was particularly difficult to replicate.
Walk et al. (1988) wondered if passive kittens paid less attention
than active ones to the environment through which they were
transported. They repeated the experiment with kittens that
either were given something interesting to watch (toy cars racing
on a track) or were allowed to move through the environment
by lifting their heads to close a microswitch that operated a
go-cart. Kittens that paid greater attention to the environment
discriminated depth on the visual cliff, whereas those reared
with similar light exposure conditions but without the increased
attention did not discriminate. The results confirmed the authors’
hypothesis, passive kittens paid less attention than active kittens
to the environment and probably this, and not the absence of
self-generated movements, enables the learning of spatial skills.
It is worth clarifying that kittens were “passive” in the sense used
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by Held, since they could not walk, but they were “active” in the
sense that they paid attention to relevant/interesting events in the
environment, being able to move their head or move according
to their control. We will return to this point later.
Another point of confrontation with Held’s work concerned
rearrangement experiments that involved adapting hand-eye
coordination, for example, marking with a pencil the position of
a cross that was seen through prisms. Several studies indicated
that the perceived discrepancy between the optical image and the
postural sensation of the hand was an important cue not taken
into account in Held’s explanation of adaptation (Kravitz and
Wallach, 1966; Wallach, 1968; Lackner, 1974). According to these
studies, the discrepancy is constant and independent whether the
hand is moved passively or actively. Therefore, there is no need
to re-correlate motor information. The problem is actually one of
detecting the constant discrepancy between the true and the seen
position of the limb. Adaptation consists in resolving these visual-
spatial conflicts. This process involves a great range of factors
and subsumes elements like attention, that affect the accuracy of
registering the mentioned discrepancies (Lackner, 1981).
Other action-based perspectives at that time, such as incipient
work in ecological psychology, also showed a distancing from
Held’s proposal. James Gibson’s early empirical work on sensory
adaptation was not equivalent to Held’s. It was more focused on
what he called phenomenal adaptation. He had developed diverse
experiments on adaptation to negative aftereffects (Gibson, 1933,
1937; Gibson and Radner, 1937). These were simple effects
showing that during prolonged looking, adaptation can occur
in the perceived curvature and tilt of static lines, the curves
tending to become straighter and the tilts tending to become
either more vertical or horizontal. These perceptual adaptations,
according to Gibson, were a sort of phenomenal normalization
to the usual conditions of the physical environment. Beyond
these experiments, Gibson’s theoretical developments are closely
related to “behavioral” adaptations, as he called them. In
particular, he did not think that there were important differences
in the perceptual information that could be obtained with self-
generated movements and passive movements. While he argued
that to perceive it is necessary to establish sensorimotor invariants
(Gibson, 1979), it seems that the movements activating those
invariants could also be passive. The concept of information
flow, understood as the pattern of change sensed by the
perceiver (Gibson, 1950), for instance, offers the possibility
of explaining sensory adaptation processes through passive
movements. According to Gibson, in relation to the sensory
adaptation experiments:
“Head-movements would be necessary for isolating these new
invariants; perhaps voluntary head movements would help in
directing attention to them but passive movements should be
sufficient. [. . .] In short, according to this formula there is a
way of “finding out” about the environment without necessarily
behaving in the sense of performing or executing actions.”
(Gibson, 1967/1997, §. 9).
Gibson’s position can also be understood by his considerations
on proprioception and exteroception, which he did not consider
as two fundamentally different and separate channels of
information. The exteroceptors, such as the retina, are sensitive
both to changes in the direction of objects that move in
the environment and to the flow of patterns produced by
the movement of the head. Meanwhile, proprioceptors can
account for both externally imposed passive movements and
self-generated ones. Gibson abandons the notion of independent
and purely exteroceptive or proprioceptive fields, and the main
problem becomes one of exhaustively defining the entire array
of stimulation, irrespective of the particular receptors involved
(Cohen, 1981).
“Proprioception considered as the obtaining of information
about one’s own action does not necessarily depend on
proprioceptors, and exteroception considered as the obtaining of
information about extrinsic events does not necessarily depend
on exteroceptors.” (Gibson, 1966, p. 34).
Attentive to Gibson’s work on phenomenal adaptation (in
curved and tilted lines), Held and colleagues expanded the study
of these effects by exploring the possibility they may be enabled by
a motor component as well. In two similar studies, they assessed
adaptation to tilt (Mikaelian and Held, 1964) and curvature
(Held and Rekosh, 1963) under active and passive conditions
using specific prisms that modify these properties. Both studies
were very ingenious; participants had to estimate the state of
lines before and after exploring a scene with a random array
of small spots. This has the effect of removing from the visual
environment any lines or curves that could provide normalizing
visual cues for straightness or vertical/horizontal orientation. In
the active condition, participants could self-locomote with the
goggles, while in the passive one they were transported by an
experimenter on a wheelchair or a cart along the same route.
Both studies confirmed Held’s proposal, only self-generated
movements under the transformed condition induced by the
goggles make participants compensate for the errors due to the
prism. On removing the goggles, they experience an aftereffect
of the same magnitude, but in the opposite direction as the
prismatic distortion. In the passive conditions the after-effect is
much smaller. These findings imply that even processes classified
as purely visual or phenomenal, such as adaptation due to
normalization effects, can also involve motor factors.
Discussions at the time seem to arrive at the consensus that
self-generated movements were not essential to achieve sensory
adaptation although their presence could facilitate the adaptive
process (Welch, 1978). Irving Rock summarized the state of
affairs: “[self-generated] movement is important only because
it allows for certain kinds of information to be registered, not
because movement per se is necessary” (Rock, 1966, p. 42). From
the 1970s onward Richard Held abandoned the study of sensory
adaptation, as he describes in his autobiography (Held, 2008).
LATER REPERCUSSIONS OF HELD’S
WORK
After a period of relative quiet, today Held’s proposal resonates
with contemporary action-based theories of perception. The idea
has a strong affinity with the enactive approach according to
which perception relies on the mastery of lawful sensorimotor
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regularities, with self-generated movements being an enabling
(and possibly constitutive) condition for developing these
sensorimotor schemes or contingencies (O’Regan and Noë, 2001;
Noë, 2004; Di Paolo et al., 2017). Varela et al. (1991) brought
the kittens experiment to the attention of a younger generation:
“This beautiful study supports the enactive view that objects
are not seen by the visual extraction of features but rather by
the visual guidance of action” (pp. 174–175). This view was
inspirational for the field of evolutionary robotics during the
1990s and 2000s, where the role of self-generated activity could
easily be appreciated in concrete examples (Nolfi and Floreano,
2000; Harvey et al., 2005; Vargas et al., 2014) particularly in
models where perceptual information is generated by a robot’s
own activity as in the case of a wheeled robot that uses its own
angular velocity while circling objects to discriminate their size
(Pfeifer and Scheier, 1999). Self-generated activity was explicitly
investigated in developmental robotics, as in a replication of the
kittens experiment using real mobile robots (Suzuki et al., 2005).
The fit of Held’s ideas with the contemporary ecological
perspective is less clear. Mention of Held’s work is cursory
or absent from many important books in this tradition (e.g.,
Lombardo, 1987; Reed, 1996; Heft, 2001; Chemero, 2009; Turvey,
2019), although it enjoyed some recognition in ecological theories
of development (see below). While it is still argued that in order
to perceive it is necessary to establish sensorimotor invariant rules
(Lobo et al., 2018), it is difficult to find similar pronouncements
on the explanatory status of self-generated movements.
Mossio and Taraborelli (2008) have discussed these differences
between the two schools. Ecological theories conceive
of sensorimotor invariants as a specific transformation of
information linked to the perceiver’s motion, but their presence
and structure do not rely on the voluntary execution of specific
motor schemes. By contrast, for the enactive approach motor
schemes are intrinsic constituents of perceptual invariants,
and schemes are themselves always constituted by bodily and
environmental processes. Perception involves the activation
of a network of actual and virtual powers and sensitivities,
which by definition cannot be entirely passive, and in the case
of honing perceptual skills adaptation processes cannot be
divorced from activity of some kind (Di Paolo et al., 2017).
Ecological psychologists focus on the transformation in the
ambient array, while enactivists on the changes produced by
active sensorimotor schemes. It is a simplification, but it may be
helpful to understand this difference to think that for ecological
psychologists the paradigmatic case from which perception in
general is explained is vision, e.g., appreciating the affordances of
a complex scene, while for enactivists it is touch, e.g., perceiving
the softness of a sponge by squeezing it.
This crude characterization serves as a first step in
differentiating the enactive and ecological positions.
Experimental evidence, however, belies this simple picture. For
example, parallax and depth perception in cases of ambiguous
optic flows are robustly dependent on voluntary movements
by the observer (Wexler and van Boxtel, 2005). Wexler (2003)
studied the perception of ambiguous optic flows under voluntary
(self-produced head movement), involuntary (movement
controlled by an experimenter), and mismatch displacement
conditions (the participant moves a wheelchair with her hands).
These conditions help disentangle motor signals for action
initiation (assumed to be available only in voluntary motion)
and proprioceptive and vestibular information. The same optic
flow information leads to different perceptions in voluntary vs.
mismatch and vs. passive conditions. Wexler observes that the
difference cannot be due to external flows or to proprioception
alone but depends on the motor command. However, “it is not
the mere presence of a corollary discharge, but the details of
the motor command that are crucial to spatial vision” (p. 344).
Wexler concludes that not only can we not disregard self-motion
in spatial vision, but “the observer’s active role in initiating and
producing that motion is [also] crucial” (p. 344). This evidence,
that could be taken to support an enactive interpretation, could
also be interpreted ecologically if the sources of integrated
information are extended to include motor commands and other
somatosensory signals.
Studies like these show that it is difficult to attribute empirical
results as supporting either the simplified versions of the enactive
or ecological positions. The evidence used often arises from
perceptual situations where sensorimotor schemes are already
consolidated. One way to force a contrast between the two
perspectives is to analyze the development of sensorimotor
invariants or contingencies. Trying to answer how sensorimotor
invariants achieve a stable structure can shed light on the role of
self-generated movements.
To clarify the discussion, we use the terminology introduced
by De Jaegher et al. (2010) to describe different kinds of causal
relations giving rise to a phenomenon. A contextual factor is one
whose alteration changes the manifestation of a phenomenon, but
not whether it is manifested or not, an enabling factor is causally
necessary for a phenomenon to occur, and a constitutive factor
is an inextricable part of what makes the phenomenon what it
is. Accordingly, for ecological perspectives self-generated motion
has a contextual or at most an enabling or instrumental role in
the specification of invariants, while for the enactive perspective
it has an enabling or even constitutive role in the consolidation of
sensorimotor schemes.
From an enactive perspective, perception is constituted
by the skillful use of regularities that govern the ongoing
coupling between motor and sensory activity, i.e., sensorimotor
contingencies (Noë, 2004). Sensorimotor disruptions present the
perceiver with radical obstacles and lacunae. Her established
sensorimotor skills suddenly cease to make sense. Perceptual
adaptation consists in the re-equilibration of sensorimotor
schemes guided by engagement in a particular activity and the
norms it defines, e.g., whether or not the intended object is
reached successfully, quickly, efficiently, and so on. While the
changes involved are more radical, the processes themselves
are, as in Held’s proposal, continuous with those of ongoing
equilibration involved in minor adjustments and recalibration
(Di Paolo et al., 2014, 2017). A key element of adaptation and
perceptual learning is the need for self-generated activity by
the agent. New sensorimotor schemes cannot be learned unless
the agent engages the world actively and confronts various
breakdowns and tries to recover from them, all within the
normative context of the activity itself. The degree and speed of
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adaptation will depend on whether the new normative situation
is radically novel or a modification of established habits. This
may explain why adaptation is not observed in conditions
of mismatched voluntary movement in experiments by Held
and Mikaelian (1964) where participants able to walk normally
are asked to move themselves in a wheelchair. The time for
adapting to a task with a very different normativity (stipulating
the appropriate energy, reach, duration, and coordination of
movements) can be expected to be significantly longer. Other
things being equal, the enactive approach predicts that adaptation
will eventually occur even in such cases (and that people with
experience controlling wheelchairs will adapt faster).
Sensory adaptation experiments, either following the
rearrangement paradigm or in cases of sensory substitution, are
frequently cited in support of the enactive account (Varela et al.,
1991; Myin and Degenaar, 2014). Situations of rearrangement
make apparent the established relation between sensorimotor
schemes and perception by distorting it. In order to perceive
correctly again this relation must be re-established. The perceiver
must modify her sensorimotor schemes. Action and perception
are constituted as an internal relation between two terms:
the perceiver’s repertoire of skills and sensitivities, and the
environment. (By internal relation we mean a relation on
which the related terms depend and through which they
change together, as opposed to an external relation between
already defined and fixed entities.) This relation is enacted in
concrete form in each particular situation involving current
and historical environmental constraints and opportunities,
goals, motivations, and so on. Changing either term induces a
breakdown in the organization of this relation. This breakdown
cannot be recovered exclusively from the agent’s side or from
the environment’s side because a new meaningful coherence
must be found between two terms in dynamic flux. For this
reason, perceptual adaptation is neither the construction of new
correlations that internally rearrange environmental data nor the
discovery of pregiven invariants in the environment. Rather, it
is the result of re-organizing the internal relation between these
terms by simultaneously engaging agents and the world. It is
eminently a practical, rather than an intellectual, process.
Perceptual learning demands active engagement by the agent
with the environment on two related counts: (1) as the process
through which new regularities can be explored and equilibrated,
and (2) for establishing situated norms that regulate equilibration
(otherwise there is no way for the agent to know what counts as
success or failure and no way to produce new coherent, task-
dependent, sensorimotor relations). For each of these reasons,
one causal, the other specifying of what to learn, self-generated
activity is both enabling and constitutive of perceptual learning.
This activity will in general take the form of combined voluntary
overt motor actions such as locomotion, and covert activity such
as modulating the focus of attention. It may even take place
largely through non-overt activity, as in the case of patients with
locked-in syndrome learning to use a brain-computer interface
(Kyselo and Di Paolo, 2015).
Ecological psychology studies on recalibration have discussed
the role of activity in terms of its relation with environmental
flow. For example, Rieser et al. (1995) induced discrepancies
between a participant’s walking speed on a treadmill and the
rate of optic flow as the treadmill is dragged by a tractor.
After these experiences, they showed evidence of perceptual
recalibration that cannot be explained by considering motor
activity or environmental flow separately. Instead, it is the
product of the participant’s sensitivity to the covariance between
the two. The authors state that it is difficult to disentangle the
precise influence of each variable and that “much work remains to
specify the biomechanical information. For example, is efference
important?. . . Is reafference important. . . ?” (p. 496).
Self-generated activity has been more explicitly recognized
in ecological approaches to development. Eleanor Gibson seems
to have been more sympathetic to the implications of Held’s
work than her husband for whom, as we have seen, self-
generated movements could be helpful in perception, but not
necessary as such. Eleanor Gibson’s approach to perceptual
learning and development is indeed compatible with James
Gibson’s ideas, but puts more emphasis on the importance of
the organism’s active role in exploring the environment (Adolph
and Kretch, 2015). Animal and environment are considered as an
interactive reciprocal system in which self-produced movement
provides dynamic simultaneous information about oneself and
environmental events (Gibson and Pick, 2000; Szokolszky et al.,
2019). Eleanor Gibson considered locomotion as one of the
major organizing behavioral systems in infancy, which allows the
learning of many affordances. According to her view, perceptual
development implies learning to detect new affordances as
action capabilities change due to changes in the body (Gibson,
1992). In a mutual relation that unfolds developmentally,
efficient visually controlled locomotion involves perceiving what
a given surface affords, and detecting the information that
specifies this affordance requires experience in guiding the
body. This experience plays a critical role in perceiving the
affordance of a surface for locomotion (Gibson and Pick,
2000). Eleanor Gibson was overall more receptive to discussing
and accepting the implications of Held’s work (e.g., Gibson,
1969). She mentions the kittens study in support of her
own views:
“Self-produced movement, while guiding locomotion visually,
emerged as a critical factor in research with kittens by Held and
Hein (1963) [. . . ] This finding strengthens the notion that guided
action combining visual and kinesthetic information from the
action systems involved is essential for the kind of affordance that
is being learned” (Gibson and Pick, 2000, p. 113).
Along similar lines, Karen Adoph’s studies on infant
locomotion led her to the view that a period of self-produced
experience is needed to learn to perceive affordances and avoid
the visual cliff (Adolph, 2000; Kretch and Adolph, 2013). The
learning experience gained with attaining a given posture (e.g.,
avoiding risky staircases when crawling) is not automatically
transferred when a new motor ability is acquired (e.g., walking). It
is necessary to learn to perceive the affordances involved in each
case, since the perceptual consequences of moving while crawling
or walking are very different. To say that self-produced activity is
needed, crucial, or essential for perceptual development amounts
to assigning it an explanatory role that is not merely contextual,
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but also enabling, i.e., without this activity, perceptual learning
would not occur.
More recently, Jacobs and Michaels (2007) have proposed a
direct learning approach whereby adaptive changes in perception
occur without mediating inferential processing. The theory
formally describes the information for learning as a vector field
covering the space of all the perception-action couplings that
can be used to perform an action. Each point in this space
corresponds to a specific coupling. Changes during learning are
represented as paths. Perceptual learning in this model involves
three processes: the education of intention, the education of
attention, and calibration. Through the education of intention
agents in a situation with multiple alternatives can improve “in
choosing which of the possible perceptions and actions they
intend to actualize” (p. 326). The education of attention, a
term taken from Gibson (1979), is the process of learning to
detect the most useful informational variable, even if intention
does not change. Calibration consists of changes in the way
the informational variable that is operative at a particular
moment is used in perception or action. This model is meant to
explain a wide range of phenomena in ecologically relevant and
informationally rich situations as well as in simpler experimental
situations. Although it does not explicitly address the issue of self-
generated movements, it makes a clear reference to the active
role of the agent. A recent reading of this work suggests that
there is an equivalence between the model and the enactive
proposal described by Di Paolo et al. (2017). The similarities
include, among others, the point that direct learning requires
the active role of the perceiver through the perception-action
coupling (Higueras-Herbada et al., 2019).
Why do we find different positions within the ecological
perspective in relation to Held’s proposal? We believe that
this is because theories of perceptual learning (Gibson, 1969;
Gibson and Pick, 2000; Jacobs and Michaels, 2007) make
use of a concept of agency that is not emphasized in more
orthodox ecological positions (beyond the recognition that the
determinants of behavior are not exclusively environmental,
see Withagen et al., 2012). This concept has emerged more
explicitly in recent decades and is part of ongoing discussions
within ecological psychology. In a keynote address on the future
of psychology published in 1994, Eleanor Gibson referred to
agency as one of the hallmarks of human behavior. She uses
the term to describe the case when an organism manifests
at least some autonomy and control (Gibson, 1994). Agency,
according to her, is manifested in human behavior together with
three other fundamental hallmarks: prospectivity, retrospectivity,
and flexibility. Prospectivity and retrospectivity help define a
particular animal’s region of controllable agency. Prospectivity
directs action and attention toward the emerging features of
situations. Retrospectivity enables agents to coordinate past
experiences with present control. Flexibility in action control
refers to the interchangeability of means to achieve the ends of
action. From these elements Edward Reed (1996) points out that
the actions of agents are not the effects of just any previous cause.
“Their actions are part of a stream of regulatory activities that
are typically self-initiated and modified and regulated by both
internal and external factors.” (Reed, 1996, p. 19). Such ideas
are consistent with Chemero’s (2009) proposal that we should
not think of affordances as dispositional properties. We should
understand them in relational terms instead. Chemero believes
that perception and action should always be considered in the
context of the agent-environment system. To understand the
relationship that an agent establishes with her environment, it is
not enough to simply focus on the constraints and regularities
that may exist, it is also necessary to focus on how the agent is
able to selectively be sensitive to or be invited by some affordances
and not others (Bruineberg et al., 2019). In making agency
an important concept as well as a topic for further research,
this ecological strand finds much in common with the enactive
approach, for which the idea of agency is central (e.g., Di Paolo,
2005; Barandiaran et al., 2009; Di Paolo et al., 2017).
The discussion today, as it was in the 1960s and thereafter,
is fraught with difficulties that arise from the use of apparently
straightforward formulations in the context of very complex
phenomena. Held proposed that self-generated movements
are necessary for achieving sensory adaptation, for perceptual
learning and, in general terms, for perceiving in a stable manner.
To this we have seen a range of responses that go from
the flat denial that self-generated movements (or movement
at all) play a role in perceptual learning, to James Gibson’s
interpretation that they may facilitate attention but are not really
necessary, to Eleanor Gibson and colleagues suggesting they are
indeed necessary as part of a mutual developmental influence
between action and perception, and to the enactive view, for
which an agent’s activity is not only necessary but is itself an
inseparable part of the processes of perceptual learning. We have
interpreted these different views in terms of contextual, enabling,
and constitutive relations. Table 1 summarizes the possible
positions on the causal status of self-generated movements in
perceptual learning.
We will not attempt to settle the debate here, in part because
we must still critically examine the notions of activity and
passivity that have been used above. As with other ideas in these
discussions, this distinction is anything but simple.
IS THERE EVER A PURELY PASSIVE OR
PURELY ACTIVE CONDITION?
Several attempts to replicate Held’s rearrangement studies were
unsuccessful. There is an intrinsic difficulty in determining
what counts as active and passive conditions in experimental
situations. Simple operational definitions can be deceiving.
It may be possible to restrict some body movements (e.g.,
locomotion, movements of the arm) but minor movements
(e.g., head or eye movements) are more difficult to control.
For instance, in the Held and Hein (1963) experiment all
kittens could move their limbs, the difference was that for
the passive group there was no correspondence between limb
movement and displacement. Active processes that potentially
influence perceptual learning can occur in situations of passivity.
Indeed, several of Held’s studies show a marked individual
variability in the passive condition. Although most of the
passive subjects failed to adapt, some did so partially or even
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TABLE 1 | Summary of the different responses to Held’s proposal concerning the causal status of self-generated movements (SGM) for sensory adaptation and
perceptual learning.
Explanatory status Interpretation Proponents
Contextual SGM may facilitate perceptual learning, but learning can occur without them J. J. Gibson, Rock, Welch, Lackner
Enabling SGM are necessary for perceptual learning and development through reciprocal loops
between action and perception. Perceptual learning is not possible without them
E. J. Gibson, Adolph, Noë, O’Regan
Constitutive SGM, or self-generated activity in general, are an integral part of the processes of
equilibration, stability, and formation of new schemes that define perceptual learning
Noë, Di Paolo et al.
The names mentioned as proponents for each case serve only as examples and are based on specific items of literature (not a whole oeuvre). In some cases, (e.g., Alva
Noë) the position may be ambiguous between more than one possibility.
fully (e.g., see Held and Hein, 1958; Held and Bossom, 1961;
Hein et al., 1970).
Even in cases where participants are completely immobile
or are moved by an external force, it is very hard to account
for what they are attending to. In the replication of the
kittens study by Walk et al. (1988), animals in the passive
condition that were watching the toy cars could not locomote
but could freely move their head. The authors downplay the
role of these movements and attribute spatial learning to
the visual scene that captures the kittens’ attention. These
movements, however, were very frequent and enabled kittens
to discover “a world in depth” (Walk et al., 1988, p. 251).
So, even if they could not perform active locomotion, these
subtle exploratory actions elicited by the kittens’ interest in
the experimental situation could have contributed to learning.
It can be hard to determine whether it was one or the
other, head and eye movements or visual attention, that
gave rise to learning. It may even be a confounded effect
between these factors as presumably attention would have faded
quickly if the animals could not explore the scene with head
and eye movements.
Similar ambiguities arise when defining what counts as an
active condition. There can be important differences in the
repertoires of actions that participants can perform, from very
rich to extremely poor patterns, from attentive and energetic
to distracted and lethargic attitudes. As with attention, it is not
always easy to ascertain the level of motivation or fatigue with
which participants actively perform a task.
An anecdote from an ongoing experiment by two of the
authors serves as an example for the point in question.
We have performed a study to compare the effect of
active and passive exploration on a task where participants,
blindfolded and seated, had to reach toward a sound source
located in front of them at different distances (similar
task as in Hüg et al., 2019). In the active condition,
during a training session participants freely explored the
arrangement until reaching and touching the sound source.
In the passive condition their arm was moved with a sling
by the experimenter until the hand made contact with
the source. In the posttest the “active” group showed a
more precise performance. The “passive” group showed great
variability; some participants improved their performance,
others did not and others exhibited strange response patterns.
At the end of the experiment, passive participants reported
very different experiences. For example, one said that she
was practically asleep. Another commented that he was
extremely attentive to how his arm was being moved. In
general, we could not determine these differences from
mere observation.
These ambiguities are also manifested in neuroimaging
studies. Passive conditions can differ significantly depending on
the protocol, motivation, or attention. If passive movements
are mechanically administered by a robot, the brain regions
that become activated differ from those involved when an
experimenter moves the body of the participant. Van de
Winckel et al. (2013) suggest that this occurs because the
movements performed by the experimenter are never exactly
the same, which stimulates in the participant an awareness
and sensory monitoring of the moved body. It is not clear
if self-generated and passive movements involve the same
brain regions. Some studies show that both common and
different areas are activated (Sahyoun et al., 2004; Ciccarelli
et al., 2005; Van de Winckel et al., 2013). Others do
not find any significant difference (Weiller et al., 1996;
Guzzetta et al., 2007).
What may look like a reasonable experimental
operationalization can fail to capture relevant aspects of a
participant’s activity. Activity does not fully stop simply because
participants are instructed not to move by themselves. There is,
to an extent, always an active element even in the most passive
of conditions provided the participant is indeed awake and
capable of regulating attention, emotion, effort, inner speech,
etc. Participants in typical passive conditions accept an external
control source for their movements. But this can involve active
elements such as inhibiting a habitual resistance to such external
interventions and remaining vigilant that movements do not
become too uncomfortable. There is, in contrast, an inherently
passive element in every experimental situation, no matter how
freely participants may move, in that they accept and comply
with the instructions they are given and do not intervene by
altering the experimental set-up.
To confound matters further, attributing responsibility
for action can be difficult due to social factors, not only
in situations of explicit social interaction (De Jaegher et al.,
2010), but in general as experimental instructions, clarifications,
unintended suggestions, attitudes toward experimenters, social
norms, differences in culture and personality, and so on,
all form part of a joint participatory construction of sense
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007). Allowing the intervention
of another person over the initiation and regulation of
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our sensorimotor schemes, as in most experimental passive
conditions, is a form of interaction that demands an active
kind of acceptance and monitoring (see Di Paolo et al.,
2018, pp. 148–149). What a participant does or does not
do in active or passive conditions is shaped by the social,
linguistic, cultural, material, and technical factors at play
in the experiment.
Activity and passivity should not in general be understood
as forming a binary distinction. This is the case even in
apparently well-defined scenarios where the distinction is applied
to a restricted domain, such as whether a movement is
self-generated or not. With this, we do not intend to imply
that the distinction is useless and should be abandoned. Rather,
we think it should be refined. We believe there are different
degrees and different dimensions of activity and passivity and
that articulating these differences has important theoretical and
experimental implications.
A first correction that can bring some clarification is to
acknowledge that the distinction is in general only a relative one.
Given a series of constraints (instructions, set-up, protocol) it
may be perfectly valid to describe a condition as active if it allows
a significantly higher degree of choice, control, and engagement
by the participant than the passive condition, and vice versa
(i.e., “more/less active than . . .”). If constraints remain fixed,
the relative difference between the conditions is expected to be
maintained. However, since activity and passivity are defined
relative to each other, this makes comparison between different
experiments risky because of the difficulty of comparing in
detail what counts as active or passive in different labs, set-
ups, etc.
A more principled approach to refining the active-passive
distinction results from considerations concerning the sense
of agency, i.e., the aspects of lived experience that continually
tell us whether we are the agents of our actions (see e.g.,
Synofzik et al., 2008; Gallagher, 2012). The sense of agency is
illuminating not only because it involves the experienced aspects
of the active-passive spectrum but also because the conceptual
complexity is similar. The sense of agency is not an either-
or aspect of experience, contrary to what we may think by
contrasting clear-cut cases such as moving an arm or having
somebody else move it for us. It is a sense with many facets not
always easy to disentangle. Some aspects of the sense of agency,
particularly the feeling of being involved in an action, are pre-
reflective and phenomenologically recessive, that is, in normal
circumstances primary awareness is with the action not with
who is performing it. In cases of breakdown, interruptions, etc.,
however, we become more presently aware that it was the action
that we ourselves have been performing (“something stopped
me in my tracks”). Other aspects of the sense of agency, such
as the judgment of agency can be reflective, i.e., when we take
an introspective stance in the planning of an action or when
monitoring its performance. These aspects can take the form of
retrospective conceptual attributions (“I did that”) or ongoing
deliberate regulations (“Now I must move this cursor just a bit
more to the right”).
Similar differences apply to the active-passive distinction. We
can expect both pre-reflective and reflective aspects to be in
place, as well as differences to do with the prospective/retroactive
and ongoing aspects of the action being performed. Buhrmann
and Di Paolo (2017) propose a map of these differences
(further elaborated in Di Paolo et al., 2017) and connect
the phenomenological aspects with microgenetic processes
involving the selection, initiation, control, and equilibration of
sensorimotor schemes. The same distinctions can be applied to
elucidate the active-passive distinction.
One dimension concerns action initiation. This can involve
prospective intentional aspects such as an anticipatory awareness
of being in a flow of activity and that a particular action needs
to be executed next. At the sensorimotor level action initiation
correlates with impulses to start an action as well as a sense
of urge or preparation. The dimension of action initiation is to
be contrasted with ongoing monitoring and control, where the
relevant sense is one of progressing toward the achievement of
a goal, adapting to deviations or compensating for unforeseen
events and obstacles. Imaging studies confirm that different
functional brain regions activate during preparation (before
active movement), anticipation (prior to passive movement
guided by the experimenter), and execution of movement
(Sahyoun et al., 2004).
In an experimental situation, it may be relatively easy to
control for action initiation in distinguishing between active and
passive conditions although some processes, such as preparatory
neural motor potentials corresponding to the intention to move,
may be active even if the ensuing movement is passive. These
processes can make a difference in perception, e.g., preparation
to act has been shown to affect visual discrimination (Craighero
et al., 1999; Fagioli et al., 2007). It may be less easy to establish
a clear-cut difference between activity and passivity in the
dimension of monitoring and control. Movement control can
be effectively “handed over” to an external agent but this can
TABLE 2 | Dimensions of the active-passive distinction discussed in the text (there may be more).
Dimensions of activity-passivity in SGM Description
Action/movement initiation Prospective intentions, urge to act, reflective or pre-reflective awareness about what to do next.
Preparatory motor potentials, attention to new goals.
Action/movement control Pre-reflective sense of smooth control or obstacles and breakdowns. Adaptive equilibration via existing
or newly learned schemes. Regulation via spinal circuits, etc.
Action/movement monitoring Attention, whether focused or peripheral, to actions being performed. Ongoing (pre-reflective or
reflective) verification of adequacy to intended goals.
Along each dimension different aspects of an action or movement can make it relatively more or less active. SGM, Self-generated movements.
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be an unstable situation precisely because it is unusual and may
demand actively trying not to resist the imposed movement,
or trying to accompany it, or attempting to predict what the
next stage is going to be. In the case of repetitive movements,
the participant may fall into a regular pattern where it is
unclear who is in control of the movement. Or indeed, in a
fully compliant manner, the participant could be doing none
of these things.
Controlling experimentally for monitoring is probably not
entirely possible (adding distractions or cognitive loads may
help if the point is to minimize attention but depending
on the hypothesis being tested this may not be desirable).
Participants’ monitoring in a passive condition may range from
close scrutiny of what is going on to a total lack of attention.
Again, if the task is repetitive, participants’ monitoring in the
active condition may recede almost entirely as movements
become automatic.
These dimensions of the active-passive distinction−initiation,
control, monitoring, (Table 2)—and perhaps others too, should
be explicitly considered in terms of experimental design and
for explicating which aspects of self-generated activity are
theoretically most relevant.
CONCLUSION
The studies on sensory adaptation carried out by Richard Held
and collaborators in the 1950s and 1960s provide us with a rich
material for querying the relations between action and perception
and, in particular, the role of self-generated activity in perceptual
learning. The focus of heated debates at the time, this work
is much less discussed today but clearly still very relevant for
modern enactive and ecological psychology perspectives, and for
clarifying their convergences and differences.
Many of the questions investigated by Held remain
unanswered. This is partly due to the connected difficulties
in clarifying the meaning of his proposal and in its empirical
testing. We have introduced two refinements that throw
light on the situation: one for elucidating the kinds of causal
relations that may be at play, another for explicating the
active-passive distinction.
To say that active, and not passive, participants demonstrate
sensory adaptation in cases of rearrangement can mean
different things. Self-generated activity may facilitate learning
without it being strictly necessary, or it may be required
for learning to occur, or it may itself be an inextricable
part of the learning process. We have discussed examples of
these different interpretations and proposed that they should
be, respectively, categorized into contextual, enabling, and
constitutive positions (Table 1).
To say that a participant is active, and not passive, can
also mean different things. It generally means that they are
allowed to move by themselves in contrast to being moved
by others. But this difference is relative and dependent on
the experimental conditions. Distinct dimensions of activity
can be at play in either active or passive conditions. Active
movements are externally constrained by social situations,
experimental instructions, and set-ups. Self-initiated activity does
not necessarily stop when participants allow themselves to be
moved. We have appealed to considerations regarding the sense
of agency to refine the active-passive distinction and proposed
that at least the following three dimensions be differentiated:
action initiation, action control, and action monitoring (Table 2).
These are strictly dimensions and not binaries in the sense
that different aspects and different degrees of intensity can be
at play in each.
These considerations can help us understand apparently
contradictory empirical evidence and propose more precise
hypotheses. Combining the refinements summarized in Tables 1
and 2 yields 9 possible ways of interpreting the claim that active
participants adapt better to sensory rearrangement. We do not
suggest that this list is exhaustive but it may be enough to help
elaborate more precise ways of articulating the convergences
and differences both within and between the enactive and the
ecological positions.
Clarifying the active-passive distinction goes beyond the study
of perception. It has implications, for instance, in areas such as
motor rehabilitation. It is well established that active movement
improves the recovery of motor function, but the therapeutic role
of applying movements passively is still controversial (Lindberg
et al., 2004; Zeng et al., 2018; Noble et al., 2019). Some evidence
indicates that proprioceptive input caused by passive movements
(controlled by a therapist or assisted by a robot) can contribute
to improving motor function through the reorganization of the
cortical areas involved in sensory integration (Carel et al., 2000).
Others, however, state that passive movement is insufficient
and active participation by the patient is required (Hogan
et al., 2006). Breaking down activity into the dimensions of
action initiation, control, and monitoring could help make
sense of these differences and knowing which aspects of activity
are therapeutically important could lead to improvements in
rehabilitation practices.
We conclude by highlighting again the historical and
current importance of Richard Held’s rearrangement studies.
His experimental designs were original and imaginative, his
theoretical interpretations very innovative for the time. Either by
affinity or contrast, current action-based theories of perception
owe much to Held’s work. In future work, it would be beneficial
to examine other theoretical proposals on adaptation and
perceptual learning (such as those by Harris, 1965; Rock, 1966;
Wallach, 1987), and the role of memory in such processes
(e.g., Glenberg, 1997), as well as related work in computational
neuroscience in the light of the classifications introduced here.
The dialog between enactivists and ecological psychologists,
we believe, can only benefit from the common ground that
Held’s studies provide and from understanding his ideas
more thoroughly.
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